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COLUMBIA BASIN SALMON AND THE COURTS:
REVIVING THE PARITY PROMISE
By
MICHAEL C. BLUMM*

ProfessorBlumm discusses two landmarkjudicial decisions of 1994: Idaho
Department of Fish & Game v. National Marine Fisheries Service and Northwest Resource Information Center v. Northwest Power Planning Council. Despite agency attempts to restore depleted salmon runs in the ColumbiaRiver
system caused by hydroelectric development and operations, both decisions
held that the agencies violated the law by not actingfast enough or goingfar
enough in restorationefforts. ProfessorBlumm explains how the decisions
and their aftermath could have a signifcant effect on efforts to preserve and
restore beleaguered Columbia River salmon runs.
I. INTRODUCTION

This is the first conference of the Northwest Water Law and Policy
Project, a three-year project dedicated to the preservation and wise use of
the Northwest's most precious resource-its water. Over the next three
years, we intend to examine water law from a Columbia Basin-wide perspective, unconfined by state boundaries or artificial distinctions like
water quality and water quantity. Our goal is to further sustainable water
use on a region-wide basis.' Today, we come together to examine two
landmark judicial decisions of 1994 that may signal significant changes in
the operation of the Federal Columbia River Power System, one of the
2

largest interconnected hydroelectric systems in the world.
The first case is the March 28, 1994 decision of Judge Marsh in Idaho
3
Department of Fish & Game v. National Marine Fisheries Service,

which struck down the National Marine Fisheries Service's (NMFS) 1993
biological opinion for being inconsistent with the Endangered Species Act
* Professor of Law, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark College; Director,
Northwest Water Law and Policy Project. Sections I-V are adapted from remarks delivered at
'the conference entitled "Who Runs the River?" held at Northwestern School of Law of
Lewis

& Clark College on November 4, 1994. Lorraine Bodi kindly reviewed a draft of Section VI,
which was written after the conference, Mike Schoessler helped with research assistance,
and Brett Swift supplied able editorial assistance.
1 See 1-3 BIG RIVER NEWS (Northwest Water Law and Policy Project, Portland, Or. 199495).
2 BoNEV1uL

POWER ADMm., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE COLUMBIA RIvER SysTEM: THE

INSIDE STORY 6 (1991).

3 Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. National Marine Fisheries Serv. (IDFG), 850 F. Supp.
886 (D. Or. 1994).
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(ESA). 4 The second is the September 9, 1994 decision of the Ninth Circuit
in Northwest Resource Information Center v. Northwest Power Planning
Council,5 where the court found the Northwest Power Planning Council's
7
"Strategy for Salmon" 6 to be inconsistent with the Northwest Power Act.
Both of these decisions are remarkable in that the agencies found to be
violating the Northwest Power Act 8 and the Endangered Species Act 9
were, in fact, implementing programs designed to expand efforts to protect and restore salmon runs. They were attempting to make the Columbia
River hydroelectric system more salmon friendly, if you will. But the
courts ruled that the agencies had not gone far enough or fast enough, and
both decisions criticized the agencies' slow, incremental pace of change. 10
11.

BACKGROUND

I want to start with a very brief historical perspective on where we
are in late 1994. Thirty years ago, in 1964, we were about to elect Lyndon
Baines Johnson; that now seems more a lifetime removed, but actually it
was only seven-and-a-half chinook salmon generations ago. That year the
Columbia River Treaty" and the Pacific Northwest Coordination Agreement were signed. 12 The year 1964 witnessed the maturation of the Columbia River system, although it took nine more years to complete the
physical development of the Columbia River system--the last mainstem
dam went on line in 1975.
4 Id. at 900.
5 Northwest Resource Info. Ctr. v. Northwest Power Planning Council (NRIC), 35 F.3d

1371 (9th Cir. 1994).
6 Id. at 1395; see NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, Doc. No. 91-20, AMENDMEnS TO
THE COLUMBIA BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM (PHASE FouR) (Nov. 10, 1993) (referred to
as the "Strategy for Salmon"); see also 58 Fed. Reg. 64,017 (Dec. 3, 1993) (notice of the
amendments).
,7 Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 837,

838(i), 838(k), 839-839h (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (commonly referred to as the Northwest
Power Act).
8 16 U.S.C. § 839 (1988).
9 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
10 See IDFG, 850 F. Supp. at 893 (criticizing NMFS for focusing more "on the system
capabilities tending to [favor] the status quo rather than stabilization of the species"); NRIC,
35 F.3d at 1395 (criticizing the Council for assuming "that only small steps are possible, in
light of entrenched river user claims of economic hardship" and for "sacrificing the Act's fish
and wildlife goals for what is, in essence, the lowest common denominator acceptable to
power interests").
11 Treaty Relating to Cooperative Development of Water Resources of the Columbia
River Basin, Jan. 22-Sept. 16, 1964, U.S.-Can., 15 U.S.T. 1555; see Michael C. Blumm, Hydropower vs. Salmon: The Struggle of the Pacific Northwest'sAnadromous Fish Resources for
a Peaceful'Coexistencewith the Federal Columbia River Power System, 11 ENVTL. L. 211,
243-245 (1981) [hereinafter Hydropower vs. Salmon] (discussing the Columbia River
Treaty).
12 Pacific Northwest Coordination Agreement, Agreement for Coordination of Operations.Among Power Systems of the Pacific Northwest, Contract No. 14-02-4822 (1964); see
Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 11, at 245-46; Michael C. Blulmm & Andy Simrin, The
Unraveling of the Parity Promise: Hydropower, Salmon, and Endangered Species in the
Columbia Basin, 21 ENvrL. L 657, 704-06 (1991) [hereinafter Unraveling Party].
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The year before, in 1974, modem salmon law may have been born
when Judge Boldt issued his historic decision that Indian tribes are entifled to fifty percent of the harvest.' 3 In 1978, three years after the last of
the Snake River dams went on line and some four chinook generations
ago, the National Marine Fisheries Service instituted Endangered Species
Act proceedings. 14 Two years after that, in 1980, Congress enacted and
President Carter signed the Northwest Power Act,' 5 a statute that promised "parity" between hydroelectric operations and fish and wildlife protection. 16 Some six months later, the regional fish and wildlife agencies
and Indian tribes submitted comprehensive recommendations for changing the hydroelectric system.' 7 Today, fifteen years later, the fish and wildlife agencies and tribes recommend essentially the same kinds of
changes.' 8 But their original recommendations were not adopted by the
Northwest Power Planning Council in its initial Fish and Wildlife Program in 1982,19 nor were their recent recommendations adopted by the
Council in its 1992 "Strategy for Salmon."20 And interestingly enough,
those recommendations have yet to be adopted in the ESA proceedings of
21
the last few years.
III. IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF FsH & GAME

V.

NATIoNAL MARINE FISHERIEs SERVWCE

We ought to turn first to the ESA because the initial decision under
consideration today is an outgrowth of the listing of chinook and sockeye
salmon as endangered species in 1991 and 1992,22 which some people
13 United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), affd, 520 F.2d 676
(9th Cir. 1975), offd sub nom. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fisheries Ass'n., 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
14 Biological Status Review, 43 Fed. Reg. 45,628, 45,628 (Oct. 3, 1978). See generally F.
Lorraine Bodi, Protecting Columbia River Salmon Under the EndangeredSpecies Act, 10
ENvm. L. 349 (1980) (discussing potential impacts of listing under the ESA on Columbia
Basin Fisheries).
15 See supra note 7.
16 See Unraveling Parity, supra note 12, at 662-70. The legislative history referred to
power production and fish and wildlife protection as "co-equal" partners and instructed federal water managers to treat fish and wildlife "on a par" with other purposes served by
Columbia Basin dams. H.R. REP. No. 976, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 49, 56-57 (1980)
17 See Unraveling Parity, supra note 12, at 670-74.
18 See NoRTSwwnr POWER PIANNING CoUNciL, RECOMMENDATIONS To AMEND THE ANADROMOUS FISH SECTIONS OF THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FIsH AND WnDUFE PROGRAM (1994).

19 See Unraveling Parity, supra note 12, at 674-76 (analyzing NoRTHWEST POWER PLANNING CouNc., 1982 CoLUMBIA
20 See Michael C. Blumm,

Rivm BASIN PROGRAM (1982)).
Saving Idaho's Salmon: A History of Failureand a Dubious
Future, 28 IDAHO L. REv. 667, 694 (1992) [hereinafter Saving Salmon]; NoRTHmwEST POWER
2
PLANNING CouNcIL, Doc. No. 91- 1A, AMENDMENTS TO THE COLUMBIA BASIN FISH AND WmDLIFE
PROGRAM (PHASE THREE) (Nov. 19, 1992).

See Saving Salmon, supra note 20, at 713.
22 56 Fed. Reg. 58,619 (Nov. 20, 1991) (listing Snake River sockeye salmon as "endangered"); 57 Fed. Reg. 14,653 (Apr. 22, 1992) (listing Snake River chinook salmon as
"threatened"); see also 59 Fed. Reg. 42,529 (Aug. 18, 1994) (interim rule) (reclassifying Snake
River chinook salmon as "endangered").
21
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think was the result of the Council's failure to adopt the recommendations
of fish and wildlife agencies and tribes some ten years earlier. In Idaho
Departmentof Fish & Game v. NationalMarine FisheriesService (IDFG
v. NMFS), both Idaho and Oregon sued NMFS, claiming that its biological
opinion on the 1993 plan of operations for the Columbia Basin hydroelectric dams 23 failed to satisfy the ESA. 24 Numerous other interested entities
25
in the region also joined in the suit.

The NMFS biological opinion adopted a two-step process for determining whether the 1993 system operations plan would produce jeopardy.
NMFS first asked whether the 1993 operations would achieve an interim
26
goal of reducing mortalities in relation to a selected base year period.
The base year period NMFS chose was 1986 to 1990. Second, NMFS asked
whether all proposed activities-including not just hydroelectric operations but also harvest management, hatchery releases, and habitat modifications, taken together-would be likely to stabilize salmon populations
over the long run-defined as four salmon generations, or by 2008.27 In

other words, NMFS asked whether salmon populations would rebound to
1990 levels by 2008.
The NMFS biological opinion concluded that there was no jeopardy
to Snake River salmon because it answered both of those questions in the
affirmative. According to NMFS, 1993 operations would reduce mortalities
by three to eleven percent. 28 And the goal of stabilizing salmon populations at 1990 levels by 2008 would be possible, NMFS concluded, with a
29
sixty to seventy percent likelihood.
This biological opinion was challenged in IDFG v. NMFS. In the first
reported court case to reverse an ESA biological opinion, Judge Marsh
held NMFS's biological opinion to be arbitrary and capricious.3 0 First,
Judge Marsh ruled that NMFS's decision to pick the baseline at 19861990-years of drought and low salmon returns-was arbitrary because
NMFS failed to articulate a rational connection between the factors that
led to the decline of populations and its choice of a baseline.3 1 He concluded that the chosen baseline seemed to be focused more on system
23 Under the Pacific Northwest Coordination Agreement, supra note 12, federal and
nonfederal dam operators prepare an annual plan that coordinates system operations. See

Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 11, at 245-46.
24 See Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. National Marine Fisheries Serv. (IDFG), 850 F.
Supp. 886, 888 (D. Or. 1994).
25 Participating as anicus supporting the plaintiff states were the Confederated Tribes of
the Warm Springs Reservation, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation,
the Nez Perce Tribe, the Yakama Indian Nation, and the State of Alaska. Intervening on the
side of NMFS were the Pacific Northwest Generating Cooperative, the Pacific Power Council, and the Direct Service Industries (DSIs).
26 See IDFG, 850 F. Supp. at 892.
27 See id.
28 See id. at 897.
29 See id.
30 Id. at 893.
31 Id.
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capabilities, on maintaining the status quo, than on the needs of salmon.3 2
Although he did not tell NMFS what to do on remand, he did suggest that
the agency ought to consider alternative baselines.33 He also specifically
refused to draw a line between construction-related losses that the dams
caused and operational-related losses.34
Second, Judge Marsh faulted NMFS for its use of models. Life-cycle
models were the basis for the agency's prediction of what would happen
in 2008. 3 5 Judge Marsh criticized NMFS for rejecting pessimistic assumptions in certain models. 36 Most of those pessimistic assumptions came
from models used by the fishery agencies and tribes. Marsh noted that all
the models contained considerable uncertainty, calling them "educated
guesses premised upon 'crude assumptions.'"3 7 He determined that discounting pessimistic assumptions was unwarranted and arbitrary because
it failed to account for factors such as the risks of inbreeding and what is
called the "extinction vortex," where population numbers become so small
as to create a risk that environmental catastrophes may extirpate the
38
species.
Judge Marsh concluded, in words that have been widely reported in
the press, that the biological opinion process in this case-although he
could have been speaking to the entire process of managing the Columbia
Basin hydroelectric system-"is seriously, 'significantly,' flawed because it
is too heavily geared towards a status quo that has allowed all forms of
river activity to proceed in a deficit situation."3 9 He said that the result has
produced "relatively small steps, minor improvements and adjustmentswhen the situation literally cries out for a major overhaul."40 On remand
he suggested that NMFS consider alternative baselines,4 ' and he made
clear that NMFS could not satisfy the ESA by making scientific decisions
in a vacuum. Judge Marsh interpreted NMFS's principal marching orderwhich is to base its decisions on best available scientific knowledge 2-to
impose a substantive obligation on NMFS to consider "significant information and data from well-qualified scientists such as the fisheries biologists
from the states and tribes." 43 This sentiment is remarkably similar to that
32 Id. ("NMFS focussed on the system capabilities tending to the status quo rather than

stabilization of the species.").
33 Id.

34 Id. at 895 ("Based upon my analysis of the ESA and its legislative history, I expressly
reject any attempt to impose bright-line definitions upon the hydrosystem's 'existence' vs.

'operations' or the terms 'survival' vs. 'recovery.'").
35 See id. at 896.
36 Id. at 898 ("Given the admitted high degree of uncertainty in the jeopardy analysis,

there is no rational explanation for [NMFS] to disregard only the low end, worst case
assumptions.").
37 Id. at 897.
38 Id. at 898-99.
39 Id. at 900.
40 Id.

41 Id. at 893.
42 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
43 IDFG, 850 F. Supp. at 900.
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expressed by the Ninth Circuit in the second case we consider today,,
NRIC v. NPPC.
IV. NORTHWEST RESOURCE INFORMATION CENTER V.

NORTHWEST POWER PIAAWVG COUNCIL
In Northwest Resource Information Centerv. Northwest Power Planning Council (NRIC v. NPPC), the Ninth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge
Tang, struck down the Northwest Power Planning Council's 1992 "Strategy
for Salmon"44 for failing to meet two Northwest Power Act requirements:
1) it failed to meet the Act's standards for setting biological objectives,45
and 2) it failed to explain how its decisions regarding the 1992 "Strategy"
satisfied the statute's criteria for program measures, especially criteria
that required the Council to explain its reasoning in the program when
rejecting program measures recommended by the region's agencies and
tribes. 46 The court went on to declare that those recommendations by the
agencies and tribes were entitled to "a high degree of deference." 4 7 Along
the way, the court rejected industrial customers', suggestion that program
measures had to satisfy a cost-benefit test.48
This result-judicial rejection of the Council's program-is surprising
because the program has been touted as the largest biological restoration
program on the planet. 49 The 1992 amendments were, in fact, remedial in
many ways, and offered the first substantial improvement in river flows
and system operations since 1982.50 But in the "Strategy for Salmon," the
Council failed to adopt the recommendations submitted by the agencies
and tribes, just as it had ten years earlier. The Council's reasoning for
rejecting those recommendations was scattered throughout the administrative record, although it appeared largely in an appendix entitled "Response to Comments for Phase Three."51 The court, however, rejected the
Council's invitation to search those parts of the record for the Council's
justification because it interpreted section 4(h)(7) of the Northwest Power
Act 52 to require the Council to explain "in writing, as part of the program,"
not as part of an appendix, why the recommendations satisfied the statutory criteria.3
44 The Council's "Strategy for Salmon" was the name the interstate agency gave to the
1992 amendments to its Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, which the Council first
promulgated in 1982. The amendments are discussed in Saving Salmon, supra note 20, at
690-96 (referring to them as the "1991 amendments").
45 Northwest Resource Info. Ctr. v. Northwest Power Planning Council (NR!C), 35 F.3d
1371, 1391-92 (9th Cir. 1994) (interpreting 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(C), (E)).
46 Id. at 1384-86 (interpreting 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(7)).
47 Id. at 1388-89, 1392.
48 Id. at 1394-95.
49 Nomuwmv POWER PLNN G COUNCIL, 1987 CoLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE

PRoGRum 5 (1987) ("[The program is] possibly, the most ambitious effort in the world to save
a biological resource.").

50 See Saving Salmon, supra note 20, at 692.
51 NR/C, 35 F.3d at 1386.
52 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(7) (1988).
53 NRJC, 35 F.3d at 1385-86 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(7)).
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The Ninth Circuit concluded that it was important for the Council to
put its reasoning in the program and to tie its reasoning to the statutory
criteria for two reasons. First, such reasoning promotes effective public
participation,5 which after all is one of the Northwest Power Act's purposes.5 r Second, it facilitates judicial review of the Council's actions, and
judicial review can ensure that the Council gives the statutorily-required
56
deference to the recommendations of the fishery agencies and tribes.
In a sense, we might interpret the court as simply saying that the
Council made a procedural error-that it failed to explain itself in the
proper place in' the record. But such an interpretation is not even technically true because, as the court noted, nowhere had the Council explained
itself in terms of complying with the statutory criteria for rejecting fishery
agencies' and tribes' recommendations.5 7 And, in a larger sense, this decision cannot be confined to a procedural basis because, as the court said,
the guts of the issue that it had to decide was statutory interpretation.5 8
Statutory interpretation was central to all the challenges levied against the
Council's program. The court left little doubt that the Council had misinterpreted the statute by failing to give proper deference to the recommendations of the agencies and tribes,5 9 concluding that these
recommendations were entitled to "a high degree of deference."6 0 This
deference was, owed not only to the program recommendations but also to
the agencies' and tribes' statutory interpretation of terms such as "best
available scientific knowledge" and river flows necessary to meet sound
biological objectives. 6 1
It is this deference principle, I believe, that will be the opinion's most
enduring legacy. Deference comes.from section 4(h)(7) of the Act, among
other places, where Congress required the Council to give "due weight" to
Id. at 1385.
See 16 U.S.C. § 839(3) (1988).
56 NRIC, 35 F.3d at 1385.
57 Id. at 1386.
5 Id. ("[M]ost of the parties' remaining contentions relate more to statutory interpretation of the fish and wildlife provisions of the Act, rather than the Council's substantive decisions. We recognize that many of these statutory construction issues have plagued efforts to
finalize the Strategy for Salmon. Therefore, we carefully consider the statutory interpretation issues with the expectation that our effort will aid the parties' efforts on remand.").
59 See id. at 1389 ("[W]e do not decide here whether the Council abused its discretion in
giving or failing to give proper deference to fishery managers because the record as it stands
precludes such an inquiry. We note again that the Council failed to explain, in the Program,
its reasons for rejecting the recommendations of the fishery managers. This failure of the
Council is disturbing given that it adopted, for ithe most part, the flows and measures recommended by power interests and DSIs, despite the overwhelming consensus among agencies
and tribes in favor of significantly higher flows and more scientifically-based biological
objectives.").
60 Id. at 1388-89, 1392.
61 Id. at 1389 ("We find it inherently reasonable to give agencies and tribes, those
charged with the responsibility for managing our fish and wildlife, a high degree of deference in the creation of a program and the interpretation of the Act's fish and wildlife
provisions.").
5

65
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these recommendations.6 2 The court gave a number of reasons for concluding that "due weight" meant "a high degree of deference."6 These reasons included the statute's legislative history6 4 and the fact that the
agencies and tribes were involved in drafting the statute. 65 But most importantly, the court drew this conclusion from a structural analysis of the
Act. Comparing the power provisions of the Northwest Power Act to the
statute's fish and wildlife provisions, the court determined that the former
were open-ended provisions, giving the Council considerable flexibility to
make quasi-legislative decisions, but because the latter contain more detailed criteria and procedures, they narrowed the Council's discretion considerably. 66 The court concluded that the fish and wildlife provisions
stand "in stark contrast" to the power plan provisions; the result is "bound
discretion" on the part of the Council, requiring "a high degree of deference" to the recommendations of the region's fishery agencies and Indian
67
tribes.
A second legacy of the NRIC v. NPPC decision will be the court's
determination that the statute's criteria governing the suitability of program measures are substantive.68 The court ruled that these criteria are no
less substantive than the "equitable treatment" standard that the Ninth Circuit earlier interpreted as being a substantive standard. 69 This means that
other courts will be willing to review program measures on the merits for
consistency with the statutory criteria and in light of the deference principle that the court articulated.
A third legacy of this decision will be the court's rejection of the industrial customers' argument that the benefits of each program measure
had to exceed its costs. 70 Instead, the court said that cost considerations

cannot preclude biologically sound restoration measures.7 1 Economic factors are relevant only where there exists a cheaper way of achieving the
same sound biological objective. Economics can lead to a rejection of a
program measure, but only where the overall costs of the program are
unreasonable; that is, if costs would jeopardize the Northwest Power Act's
guarantee of "an adequate, efficient, economical, and reliable power supply."72 The court emphasized, however, that the Act referred to a power

supply, not a hydropower supply,73 and cited legislative history to the effect that Congress anticipated that customers would pay all the costs of
62 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(7) (1988).
63 NR!C, 35 F.3d at 1388.
64 Id. (citing 126 CONG. REC. E10,683 (1980) (remarks of Rep. Dingell), and H.R. REP. No.
976, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 57 (1980)).
66 Id. at 1389.

6 Id. at 1387.
67 Id. at 1387-88.
6 Id. at 1389.

69 Id. (citing Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. FERC, 746
F.2d 466, 473 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1116 (1985)).

70 NR!C, 35 F.3d at 1393-95.
71 Id. at 1394.
72 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(5) (1988).
73 NRIC, 35 F.3d at 1378 n.13.
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hydroelectric operations, and that such costs should not be a deterrent to
meeting fish and wildlife needs simply because they were high.74
The court concluded its analysis by declaring that fish and wildlife
restoration was a primary goal of the Act,75 and by calling fish and wildlife
"a co-equal partner" with power generation. 76 In addition, the court explained that the Act, 1) "placed a premium on prompt action," 2) prescribed a limited role for economic considerations, and 3) recognized that
fish and wildlife were irreplaceable natural resources.7 7 Moreover, just
like Judge Marsh,78 the Ninth Circuit criticized the Council's approach of
small, incremental steps-which the court said was the result of entrenched users' claims of economic hardship.7 9 The court also faulted the
Council for assuming that its proper role was that of consensus builder,
instead of regional leader, and for its willingness to sacrifice fish and wildlife goals for what the court called "the lowest common denominator" of
salmon protection.8 0
This case replaces freewheeling Council discretion with deference to
the biological judgment of the region's fishery agencies and Indian tribes,
but raises a number of questions. For example, what deference is owed
when the fishery agencies and tribes disagree? What exactly is "an adequate, efficient, economical, and reliable power supply"? Also, I should
note that giving deference to the agencies and tribes might not necessarily
improve prospects for the salmon. After all, NMFS spent ten or fifteen
years clamoring for high flows in the 'river until it got decision-making
authority under the Endangered Species Act;88' 2then the agency failed to
prescribe those flows under its ESA authority.
V.

THE LEGACY

I am struck by the similarity between the Marsh decision and the
Ninth Circuit decision. Both opinions say that lead agencies under the ESA
and under the Northwest Power. Act cannot ignore biological opinions of
fish and wildlife agencies and Indian tribes. Of course, the Council owes a
high degree of deference, but NMFS cannot ignore biological opinions of
the agencies and tribes either.8 3 Both opinions decry the small, incremental steps approach that has always characterized efforts to restore Colum74 Id. at 1394 (citing H.R. REP. No. 976, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 49, 57 (1980)).

75 Id. at 1395.
76 Id. at 1378.
77

Id. at 1395.

78 See supra Wext accompanying notes 39-40.

79 NR!C, 35 F.3d at 1395.
80 Id.
81 See Unraveling Parity,supra note 12, at 707-08 (discussing the Columbia Basin Fish
and Wildlife Authority's fish flow proposal; NMFS is a member agency of the Authority).
82 See Saving Salm6n, supra note 20, at 713; see also Michael C. Blumm & Janice M.
Schneider, Saving Idaho's Salmon. A History ofFailureand a Dubious Future, PartH, in
WATER LAw: TRENDS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE 293, 298 (Kathleen Marion Carr & Michael D.
Crammond eds., 1995) (discussing agency failure to prescribe necessary flows for salmon).
83 Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. National Marine Fisheries Serv. (IDFG), 850 F. Supp.
886, 900 (D. Or. 1994).
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bia River salmon.84 But neither opinion demands that NMFS or the
Council do anything specific to save the Columbia River salmon.
No doubt some will complain that.these two decisions represent unwarranted judicial intrusion into complex matters better left in the hands
of administrators. But it seems to me that the courts are not attempting to
become river masters or fish masters the way Judge Boldt was forced to
some twenty years ago 8 5-that is not the judicial function. Courts have
neither the institutional competency nor the interest to manage this system that has become such a headache for so many. But the judicial role is
to signal when the system is broken, and most people who are close to
these issues know that it is in fact broken. Whether it can or will be fixed
is largely in the hands of agencies like the Council, NMFS, and Bonneville
Power Administration that will have to implement these judicial directives. But these cases mean that those future decisions are only largely in
the hands of the agencies; they are not exclusively in their hands. There is
now a promise of subsequent judicial review. That prospect is unlikely to
damage salmon restoration efforts; whether it will help them only time
will tell.
We will know fairly soon whether or not the kinds of changes that the
courts urged will take place in 1995. The Northwest Power Planning Council'is scheduled to adopt new amendments to its Fish and Wildlife Program in December 1994, and NMFS is due to adopt a revised biological
opinion in early 1995. In a very real sense, the results of those two decisions will determine the fate of some runs of Columbia Basin salmon. If
the Council and NMFS adhere to the deference and anti-incremental principles articulated by the courts, it may not be too late to save the Snake
River salmon.
VI.

EPILOGUE

On December 14, 1994, the Northwest Power Planning Council
adopted amendments to its 1994 Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program that included a phased lowering, or drawdown, of several reservoirs
to improve spring flushing flows for juvenile salmon migrating to the
sea.86 The amendments aimed to achieve a minimum monthly average
flow or velocity equivalent during the spring at Lower Granite Dam (the
uppermost dam on the Snake that salmon must pass, just west of Lewiston, Idaho) of 85 kcfs (thousand cubic feet per second) in dry water years
and 140 kcfs in wet years; in the summer, the Lower Granite minimum
7
average monthly flow goal is 50,kcfs in dry years.8 On the lower Colum84 Id.; NRIC, 35 F.3d at 1395.
85 See, e.g., FAY COHEN, TREATIES ON TRIAL- THE CONTINUING CONTROVERSY OVER NorTH-

WEST INDIAN FISHING RIGHTS 3-18 (1986) (discussing United States v. Washington, 384 F.
Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), afd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), affd sub nom. Washington
v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fisheries Ass'n., 443 U.S. 658 (1979)).
86 NORTHWESr POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, 1994 COLUMBIA BASIN FISH AND WIIF

PRO-

GRAM (1994) [hereinafter 1994 PROGRAM].

87 Id. at 5-20.
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bia, the Council's goals for peak spring flows at The Dalles Dam ranged
from 220 kcfs to 300 kcfs, depending on available storage8s The peak
flows of 140 kcfs and 300 kcfs corresponded to the fishery agencies' 1991
flow proposal.8 9
To achieve these goals, the amendments called for Lower Granite reservoir to be partially drawn down for two months in 1995, and for a lower
drawdown-to near spillway level-beginning in 1996.9o Under the
amendments, Little Goose reservoir (the reservoir immediately downstream of Lower Granite) would also be drawn down to near spillway
crest by 1999. 9 1 On the lower Columbia, the amendments called for a yearround lowering of John Day reservoir (at 78 miles, it is the longest reservoir on the lower Columbia) to near minimum operating pool by 1996, and
a decision whether to draw down to near spillway crest-a 48-foot
drawdown-by December 1996.92 In essence, to speed salmon migration,
the Council partially adopted the "Idaho drawdown plan," championed by
93
outgoing Idaho Governor Cecil Andrus.
Other 1994 amendments called for the purchase of an additional one
million acre-feet of water (in addition to an earlier requirement of nearly a
half million acre-feet) from willing sellers in the upper Snake Basin to
boost river flows, 94 and spills at mainstem dams so that eighty percent of
juvenile salmon avoid going through power turbines. 9 5 Trucking and barging of juvenile fish would be limited to "extremely adverse" river conditions, as judged by the region's fishery agencies and tribes. 96
Upon initial analysis, the Council's amendments appear to respond-to
the Ninth Circuit's criticism that the Council must take more than small,
incremental steps that represent "the lowest common denominator" of
salmon protection. 9 7 The Council's scientific analysis indicated that its
amendments will begin a slow process of rebuilding salmon runs to harvestable levels. 98 Whether the amendments will be implemented remains
an open question at this writing, 99 particularly because the federal plan
88 Id. at 5-29.
89 See UnravelingParity, supra note 12, at 708 (listing the recommended flows).
90 See 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 86, at 5-25.
91 Id. The Council also promised to decide whether to draw down the two remaining
Snake River reservoirs to near spillway crest in 2002. Id. at 5-26.
92 Id. at 5-32.
93 See UnravelingParity,supra note 12, at 725; Saving Salmon, supra note 20, at 688.
94 See 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 86, at 5-21.
95 Id. at 5-36. This 80% rate reflects a marked increased in spill efficiency. Previously, the
overall rate was 7096, and just 50% for spring and summer migrants. Id. at 5-26.
96 Id. at 5-47. The Council anticipated that "significantly fewer than half' of juvenile

salmon would be transported. Id. No transportation, would occur at drawdown reservoirs.
The Council made clear that "[t]ransportation should not be used as a device to delay substantial improvements in in-river survival conditions." Id. at 5-46.

97 See supra text accompanying note 80. The Council also included detailed statutory
findings in response to the court's directive. 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 86, at 15-1 to 15-165.
9 See 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 86, at 15-1 to 15-165.
99 The Northwest Power Act requires the federal Bonneville Power Administration to act
"in a manner consistent" with the Council's program, 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(A), and all
federal water managers, including the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Recla-
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subsequently endorsed by NMFS is inconsistent with the Council's program in some important respects.
On March 2, 1995, the National Marine Fisheries Service released its
biological opinion for the 1995-1998 operation of the Federal Columbia
River Power System. 1° ° The opinion concluded that the operation of the
hydroelectric system would likely jeopardize the continued existence of
the listed salmon species unless the federal water managers adopt a "reasonable and prudent alternative" which included immediate actions to improve mainstem salmon survival such as improved bypass, increased spills
and flows, and better operation of the barging and trucking program to
transport juvenile salmon. 01'
Perhips the biggest difference from the Council's program concerned
the fact that the NMFS opinion made no commitment to Snake River reservoir drawdowns beyond the minimum operating pool level. Instead,
NMFS directed the Corps of Engineers to undertake a drawdown feasibil-.
ity study, postponing a decision on whether to proceed with drawdowns
until 1999.102 Under the biological opinion, drawdowns at John Day reservoir would be similar to the Council's program, reaching near minimum
operating pool by 1996, but further drawdowns would await the Corps'
study. 1° 3 Instead of drawdowns, the opinion relied on a set of detailed
operational changes that would, NMFS claimed, "substantially alter[ ] the
operation of the reservoirs... increas[ing] the priority for the use of the
1°4
reservoirs for fish flow augmentation relative to power production."
NMFS asserted that, had its operational charges been in effect during
1992-1994, approximately 13 to 16 million acre-feet of water would have
been released for salmon migration, instead of the 10 to 11 million acrefeet that the Bonneville Power Administration claimed was devoted to
salmon flows. 10 5 ,However, the NMFS opinion set more modest flow
targets than did the Council's program: spring peak flows of 85 to 100 kcfs
in the Snake River (versus 85 to 140 kcfs in the Council's program) and
220 to 260 kcfs in the lower Columbia (versus 220 to 300 kcfs in the Counmation, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, to take the program into account
"to the fullest extent practicable." Id. § 839b(h)(11)(A)(ii). The Council has interpreted the
latter requirement to mean that these agencies must either implement its program or provide
a written explanation "why it will not be physically, legally, or otherwise practicable to implement the program measures, including a description of all possible allowances available
to permit implementation." 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 86, at 1-14. No court has interpreted
the meaning of either of these provisions, although the Supreme Court construed language
similar to "the fullest extent" in the National Environmental Policy Act to require compliance absent an unavoidable conflict with other statutory authorities. Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v.
Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776, 787-88 (1976).
100 NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIEs SERv., BIOLOGICAL OPINION: REINrrIATION OF CONSULTATION
ON 1994-1998 OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYsTEM AND JUVENILE TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM IN 1995 AND FUTURE YEARs (Mar. 2, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 BIOLOGIcAL
OPINION].

101
102
103
104
105

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 91.
at 92-94.
at 113:14.
at 96.
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cil's program). 10 6 The opinion also called for a more modest water
purchasing program in the upper Snake Basin, seeking less than a half
million acre-feet of water annually in 1995-1997, one million acre-feet less
than the Council's program, because the Bureau of Reclamation and Idaho
apparently convinced NMFS that it would not be realistic to expect that
10 7
more water could be purchased absent condemnation authority.
Unlike the Council's program, the NMFS opinion directed the Corps
use, of fish barging and trucking at all dams, unless directed
continue
to
otherwise by a "technical management team" composed of representatives
of NMFS, the Corps, Bonneville Power Administration, and the Bureau of
Reclamation.' 0 8 Like the Council's program, spill would be designed to
achieve eighty percent fish passage efficiency, although spill would be restricted where necessary to control dissolved gas levels. 109 Because NMFS
endorsed spills at all dams, fewer fish would be trucked or barged than
previously. But no spills would occur at dams used to collect fish for barge
and truck transport when river flows fall below the target of 85 kcfs because NMFS concluded barging and trucking was safer for the fish than inriver migration at low flows." 0 Thus, no spills would be provided for summer migrants, principally fall chinook, which would remain completely dependent on improved barge and truck transportation."'
A detailed evaluation of the contrasting approaches in the Council's
program and the NMFS opinion is premature at this point. However,
NMFS's heavier reliance on trucking and barging juvenile fish seems questionable in light of the uncertain track record of artificial transportation
over the last fifteen years. 112 It also seems unlikely that NMFS can, without reservoir drawdowns, increase river flow velocities to the target level
it established and begin rebuilding the beleaguered Snake River salmon
runs.
Although there are some uncertainties surrounding the details of reservoir drawdowns, they do make possible the flow velocities fishery managers have advocated for more than fifteen years 1 3 without as severe an
effect on upstream reservoirs and their resident fish and wildlife, recrea106 Id. at 104. NMFS's summer flow targets were 50 to 55 kcfs on the Snake, and 200 kcfs

on the Columbia. Id.
107 Id. at 99-100.
108 Id. at 110. The opinion stipulated that technical management team recommendations
would be by consensus, "except that when no consensus is reached, NMFS shall make the
recommendation." Id. at 101.
109 Id. at 104-10.
110 Id. at 110-12. NMFS concluded, however, that spill is the safest means of darn passage,

generally producing 0-3% mortalities per dam. Id. at 109.
111 Id. at 112. While all fall chinook would be barged or trucked, NMFS estimated that a
majority of spring/summer chinook would be as well: 74% at flow levels of 85-100 kcfs, and
56% at flows above 100 kcfs. Id.
112 See, e.g., 1994 PROGRAM, supra note 86, at 5-12 to 5-13, 15-116 to 15-123 (discussing
various artificial transportation studies).
113 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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tional activities, and irrigation supplies." 4 According to the Northwest
Power Planning Council, drawdowns will produce increased salmon runs
and salmon recovery,' 15 something the NMFS approach may be unable to
supply. Since the estimated cost of the Council's program is virtually the
same as the cost of the NMFS approach, 1 6 it may be that reservoir
drawdowns are the only effective salmon strategy that is also economically and politically realistic.

For example, the 11-foot drawdown of John Day reservoir would decrease smolt
travel time through the reservoir by 14% to 179. Achieving a similar reduction in water particle from flow augmentation would require 3.1 million acre-feet of storage. 1994 PROGRAM,
supra note 86, at 15-90.
115 Id.
116 Both plans are estimated to cost about $160 million annually. The Council estimated
that this would require a 6% increase in BPA's wholesale rates by 1997, and a 996 increase by
2015, about $2.00 per month for the average residential customer in 1997, $3.00 in 2015. Id.
at 1-12 to 1-13, app. B. Cf. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Press Release 2 (Mar. 1, 1995) (estimating the cost of the NMFS plan to be $160 million).
114

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2986501

